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ABSTRACT
Cued-recall graphical passwords have a lot of potential for
secure user authentication, particularly if combined with
saliency masks to prevent users from selecting weak pass-
words. Saliency masks were shown to significantly improve
password security by excluding those areas of the image that
are most likely to lead to hotspots. In this paper we investi-
gate the impact of such saliency masks on the memorability
of cued-recall graphical passwords. We first conduct two pre-
studies (N=52) to obtain a set of images with three different
image complexities as well as real passwords. A month-long
user study (N=26) revealed that there is a strong learning ef-
fect for graphical passwords, in particular if defined on images
with a saliency mask. While for complex images, the learning
curve is steeper than for less complex ones, they best sup-
ported memorability in the long term, most likely because
they provided users more alternatives to select memorable
password points. These results complement prior work on
the security of such passwords and underline the potential of
saliency masks as both a secure and usable improvement to
cued-recall gaze-based graphical passwords.
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INTRODUCTION
Graphical passwords have long been investigated as a means
for user authentication (see [7, 27] for extensive reviews).
Graphical password systems for authentication either rely on
a recognition task (the user has to recognize one or more
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the
author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org.
MUM ’16, December 12 – 15, 2016, Rovaniemi, Finland
Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
ACM 978-1-4503-4860-7/16/12...$15.00
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3012709.3012730
Figure 1: In this work we compare the memorability of graphical pass-
words defined on images with low (a), medium (b) and high (c) complex-
ity. The bottom row shows the saliency mask versions of the images.
graphical entities that together constitute their password), a
memory recall task (the user has to freely remember their
password), or a cued-recall task (the user is presented cues, for
example, an image, that help them to recall their password).
Cued-recall graphical passwords in particular have consider-
able advantages over traditional approaches, such as alphanu-
meric passwords or PINs, as they leverage the vast capacity
and capabilities of the visual system [3, 16]. A key advantage
is their increased resistance to guessing attacks, due to the
potentially larger theoretical password space [10]. In addition,
memorability of multiple graphical passwords is substantially
more effective than multiple PIN numbers and can be further
improved by using mnemonics to aid their recall [23].
Previous research suggests that the security of cued-recall
graphical passwords consisting of several password points de-
fined on a single image can be significantly increased by mask-
ing out the most salient areas of the image during password
selection [10]. These saliency masks can be automatically cal-
culated using a computational model of visual attention and
can effectively prevent users from choosing weak password
points that fall into attentional hotspots.
While saliency masks improve password security it is still an
open question what impact they have on the ability of users to
remember their passwords over long periods of time. In this
work we investigate the impact of saliency masks on short-
term and long-term password memorability in a study with 26
participants. Furthermore, our investigation provides insights
into how saliency masks impact on users’ password selection
strategies.
CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT
This work contributes (1) a user study and analysis on the
impact of saliency masks on the memorability of cued-recall
graphical passwords, both in the short term and in the long
term, and (2) a quantitative and qualitative comparison of
graphical passwords on images with different complexities
with and without saliency masks as well as 4-digit PINs.
RELATED WORK
This work draws upon prior research on graphical passwords
and techniques to improve password memorability.
Memorability of Graphical Passwords
Password memorability has long been identified as one of
the most critical usability issues [9] with 4-5 regularly used
passwords per user considered to be a maximum [1]. Graphi-
cal passwords were shown to have considerable memorability
advantages over alphanumeric passwords or PINs as they lever-
age the capabilities of the visual system [3, 16].
PassFaces is a commercial graphical password authentication
system in which users select four previously self-chosen face
images (the password) out of a larger set of images. Brostoff
and Sasse evaluated PassFaces and found that participants
made fewer login errors compared to users of alphanumeric
passwords, despite accessing the system less frequently [8].
Similar findings were obtained by Davis et al. who performed
a brief memorability comparison between PassFaces and pass-
words consisting of sequences of face images [13].
Dhamija and Perrig proposed a system were users authenti-
cated by recognizing previously seen images [15]. They com-
pared their system with user-generated alphanumeric pass-
words and 4-digit PINs and found that, after one week, par-
ticipants only made 5 % errors with their system compared to
more than 30 % with passwords and PINs.
Widenbeck et al. presented a click-based graphical password
scheme, called PassPoints, that allowed users to define pass-
words by selecting an arbitrary sequence of points on a single
image [31]. They compared their scheme to alphanumeric
passwords in a longitudinal study over six weeks and found
that both password types were equally memorable, but graphi-
cal passwords required more time to input. In follow-up work
they investigated the influence of the error margin in clicking
on the password points as well as the type of image on memo-
rability [30]. They found that while the type of image did not
have any influence, small error margins significantly reduced
password memorability – most likely because users did not
memorize password points accurately enough.
Schneegass et al. presented SmudgeSafe [25], a graphical au-
thentication scheme that applies graphical transformations to
the image on which password points are selected. In this way,
the resistance against so called smudge-attacks is enhanced.
In the context of a usability study participants rated the memo-
rability of the approach to be very high (5 on a 5-Point Likert
scale). Data were collected using experience sampling from
users who had downloaded and installed the app from Google-
Play. Hence, no information is available as to how long they
had previously used the system.
Chiasson et al. conducted a series of studies on the security
and usability of click-based graphical passwords that involved
users to select one point per image but for a sequence of several
images. In an initial study they found that performance was
very good in terms of speed, accuracy, and number of errors
and that users preferred their approach over PassPoints [12]. In
an additional laboratory and large-scale field study they were
able to validate their earlier usability claims with respect to
password memorability but they also found that the choice of
image significantly influenced login success rates [11].
Techniques to Improve Password Memorability
Several researchers investigated techniques to improve mem-
orability of both alphanumeric and graphical passwords. Re-
cently, Zhang et al. argued that interference between differ-
ent passwords in memory is one of the major challenges to
multiple-password recall [33]. They compared two methods
to alleviate interferences and found that providing the user
with the first letter of their alphanumeric password led to
significant improvement of memorability. In a similar study,
Vu et al. evaluated the accuracy for recalling alphanumeric
passwords, derived from the first letters of the words of a
sentence, and found these to be more memorable than ran-
dom passwords [28]. Yan et al. performed a large-scale study
on the memorability and security of phrase-based passwords,
i.e. memorable phrases condensed into passwords [32]. They
found that phrase-based passwords were as secure as random
passwords but significantly easier to remember.
Weiss et al. presented an authentication method, called
PassShapes, that involved users in drawing geometric shapes
constructed of combinations of eight strokes [29]. They
showed that PassShapes increased memorability when users
could practice their shapes several times – an effect that even
increased over time. Lin et al. presented a variation of the draw-
a-secret scheme originally proposed by Jermyn et al. [20] that
used a qualitative mapping between user strokes and password
to improve security without decreasing memorability [22].
Moncur et al. investigated whether users find multiple graphi-
cal passwords more memorable than multiple PINs and also
compared two memory augmentation strategies for increasing
the memorability of graphical passwords [23]. They found
that multiple graphical passwords could be more easily re-
membered than multiple PINs and that memorability could be
further improved by using mnemonics to aid their recall.
Summary
All of these studies investigated memorability as well as tech-
niques to improve the memorability of alphanumeric and cued-
recall graphical passwords. However, only few of them eval-
uated long-term password memorability over the duration of
several weeks, like for example Wiedenbeck et al. [30, 31]
and De Luca et al. [14]. In addition, there is no prior work
that investigated the impact of user-rated image complexity on
memorability.
The goal and novel contribution of this work is to evaluate
memorability for saliency masks in the long-term that were so
far only shown to increase the security of cued-recall graphical
passwords [10].
SALIENCY MASKS
To generate the saliency masks, we used a Graph-Based Visual
Saliency (GBVS) model (see [18] for details on GBVS and
[17] for the MATLAB toolbox we used). GBVS was shown
to predict human fixations on natural images with superior
performance to the original visual saliency algorithm presented
by Itti et al. [19]. The saliency masks were calculated using
the default parameters of the toolbox. The greyscale heat maps
returned by the GBVS algorithm were first normalised and
thresholded at the 0.5 level so as to separate salient and non-
salient areas of the images. The salient areas were then used
as saliency masks that were overlaid in red onto the original
images (see bottom row of Figure 1).
While previous work focused on the security of saliency
masks [10], in this work we quantitatively evaluate the impact
of saliency masks on long-term memorability of graphical
passwords. As a baseline, we use 4-digit PINs that are com-
mon when it comes to user authentication, for example, at
ATMs. Specifically, we investigate how saliency masks im-
pact on the number of false login attempts, the accuracy of
password point selection and whether there is a learning effect.
USER STUDIES
Memorability of graphical passwords defined on a single im-
age may be influenced by the complexity of that image as well
as by the specific selection of password points. We therefore
conducted two pre-studies to obtain a random set of images
with three user-rated image complexities (pre-study 1), and
real passwords, i.e. passwords defined by users, to prevent
from potential biases that manual selection of passwords may
have introduced (pre-study 2). These two pre-studies were
followed by the main study to investigate long-term graphical
password memorability with and without saliency masks.
Pre-Study 1: Image Selection
A large number of different metrics for quantifying image com-
plexity were proposed in the past. For example, while some
researchers used gray-level dependent metrics, such as con-
trast and feature distribution, others proposed edge-dependent
metrics (for example, target edge strength, average contour
length, or edge characteristics), or shape/size-dependent met-
rics (for example, number of pixels of target, the aspect ratio
of the target, or largest target size) [5, 6, 24].
These metrics were developed to meet the requirements of a
specific application or use case, such as automated target recog-
nition in images, and do not account for the user’s subjective
perception and cognitive abilities. We hence opted to follow a
user-centered approach for image selection: An independent
group of people was first asked to rate the complexity of a
large image set from which we then manually selected three
images with user-rated low, medium, and high complexity.
We automatically retrieved a random set of 20 different images
from flickr1that were under public domain license. The im-
ages mainly depict sceneries and persons similar to the actual
preferences of users when selecting images for graphical pass-
words [2]. The selection of images was not restricted in any
1http://www.flickr.com/
Figure 2: Web interfaces to (a) rate pairs of images for image complexity,
and (b) define graphical passwords consisting of four password points in
a single image on the example of an image with saliency mask (red area).
way but we made sure to obtain images with a resolution of at
least 1600×1200 pixels. All oversized images were manually
scaled down to that resolution if need be. To obtain complexity
ratings for these images, we created a website that displayed
two random but always different images next to each other.
Participants were then asked to click on the image they con-
sidered to be more complex (see Figure 2a). It is important
to note that we didn’t provide any definition of complexity
as we wanted participants to take their decision as quickly as
possible and based solely on their intuitive understanding and
subjective notion of “image complexity”.
The website was implemented to ensure that all image com-
binations were presented in randomized order (380 in to-
tal). Each image pair was shown twice with image positions
swapped. Each participant had to make 76 comparisons (20 %
of the entire data set), which took them 5 to 10 minutes. We
randomly selected three image pairs to be compared twice dur-
ing the study to be able to evaluate a-posteriori how consistent
each participant had been in rating the complexity. Participants
were recruited from University’s mailing lists, and were not
compensated for taking part in the study.
43 participants (23 female and 20 male) aged between 20
and 68 years (M = 31.0, SD = 8.9) completed the study. This
resulted in a total of 3268 image comparisons. To determine
the overall complexity of each image we calculated how often
participants considered an image to be more complex than
another. The most complex image was selected 276 times,
whereas the least complex image was selected only 48 times.
Out of the 43 participants, 26 rated all control image pairs
consistently, 15 participants rated two out of three consistently,
two participants rated one out of three consistently, and no
participant rated all image pairs inconsistently. We selected
three images for the main study: the most complex image (high
complexity), the image ranked tenth (medium complexity),
and the least complex image (low complexity). A statistical
analysis of the ratings for these images confirmed that the
image rated as most complex was significantly more complex
than the other two, χ2(1) = 17.00, p < .05, χ2(1) = 13.24,
p < .05. The analysis also confirmed that the image with
medium complexity was significantly more complex than the
one rated as least complex, χ2(1) = 5.94, p < .05.
Pre-Study 2: Password Selection
We opted to not allow participants in the main study to select
passwords themselves to prevent any potential influence of the
generation effect, i.e. the fact that memorability for passwords
is better if participants are allowed to generate them instead
of just reading them [26]. This is common practice also in
the real world, for example, for credit cards for which PINs
are assigned by the bank. Because no established method
exists for creating graphical passwords in a similar fashion as
random alphanumeric password generators, we again followed
a user-centred approach for password selection.
We needed three types of real passwords: 4-digit PINs as well
as graphical passwords consisting of four password points in
an image with and without a saliency mask. For the PINs, we
asked 10 people on the university campus to secretly write
down a non-trivial 4-digit PIN that they were not currently
using. For the graphical passwords, we created a website and
asked participants from the first pre-study to define passwords
consisting of four password points by clicking on the images
selected in the first pre-study. Each participant had to define
passwords for each of the three images as well as with and
without saliency mask (Figure 2b). The saliency masks were
overlaid in red onto the original images and it was not possible
for participants to click into these areas. It was also impossible
to select password points that overlapped. There was no time
limit for creating the passwords and participants were allowed
to modify the password as often as needed. To ensure that
participants selected passwords they could remember, they had
to validate the password directly prior to finally submitting it.
If they were not able to validate the passwords within three
attempts, they were asked to redefine the password.
Nine people (three female, six male) aged 20 – 48 years
(M = 30.0, SD = 7.5) participated in the study. Each partic-
ipant defined six graphical passwords on the three images
obtained in the first pre-study. This resulted in a total of 54
real passwords. We had to exclude two trivial PINs from the
10 PINs that we initially collected (“0000” and “1234”).
Main Study
The pre-studies yielded a set of images with different complex-
ities as well as real passwords chosen by users. The goal of
the main study was to investigate the impact of saliency masks
on short- and long-term password memorability. To this end,
we conducted a long-term study in which each participant had
to remember and login to a custom web interface using three
Figure 3: Example login attempt. Blue dots and lines denote the pass-
word to be remembered, while green dots indicate correctly and red dots
wrongly entered password points. White circles visualize the accepted in-
put area around each password point (not shown to participants).
types of passwords: one 4-digit PIN (baseline) and two of the
graphical passwords, one of which was defined on an image
with saliency mask (GPs) and one of which was defined on an
image without a saliency mask (GP).
We created a web interface where participants could login
using their PIN and graphical passwords. PIN entry was im-
plemented using a standard HTML text form. To enter their
graphical passwords, participants could select password points
by clicking on the image with the mouse.
Participants were recruited from lectures, University mailing
lists, and Facebook. As compensation we raffled three 30
EUR Amazon vouchers among all participants. The study was
conducted as a controlled study following a within-subjects
repeated measures design. It consisted of an initial session in
which participants remotely obtained and validated their pass-
words using the web interface (validation session) and three
remote login sessions using the same web interface. Login
sessions were performed over several weeks: one week, two
weeks, and four weeks after the validation session. Note, that
the saliency masks were never shown to the participants and
they therefore did not know which passwords had originally
been defined with and without a saliency mask.
During the recruiting process, participants were provided with
a link to the study website. As participants accessed the link
for the first time, the initial session was started. Participants
were first introduced to the overall study procedure and asked
to complete a short demographic questionnaire. Afterwards,
participants were given a brief tutorial in which they were
explained the interface and how to enter passwords using the
mouse. Participants were then shown the first password and
asked to immediately validate it by using it to log into the
system. After three failed login attempts they were shown the
password again. This procedure was repeated for all three pass-
words. Following the validation, participants were asked for
their opinion on whether they would be able to remember their
passwords (5-point Likert item, 1: won’t be able to remember























Figure 4: Percentages of successful logins (three attempts to correctly
enter the password) for the different types of passwords in the validation
session as well as after one, two and four weeks.
After one, two, and four weeks, participants automatically re-
ceived an email reminding them to log in using the graphical
passwords and PIN they had received in the initial session. In
order to minimize differences in the time intervals between
logins across all participants – that might have influenced mem-
orability – participants received another reminder email after
24 hours. If they did not login within a maximum of 48 hours
they were excluded from the study. The presentation order of
the passwords was randomized for each session. Participants
had three login attempts for each of the three passwords. Simi-
lar to earlier long-term studies on password memorability [14,
29, 31], participants were shown the password again if they
could not remember one of their passwords.
Finally, all participants who finished the fourth week of the
study were asked to complete a short online questionnaire
on the perceived complexity of all three images used in the
main study and the perceived difficulty of remembering their
own graphical passwords and PIN (5-point Likert item, 1: not
complex/difficult to remember; 5: very complex/difficult to
remember). Given that writing down passwords is common
practice [1], we also asked for any password aids participants
had used, as well as the daily context in which they had partic-
ipated (for example, at home, at work, while traveling).
Similar to previous studies on password memorability we com-
pared the three types of passwords in terms of the number of
failed login attempts. A login attempt was considered failed if
any Euclidean distance between selected and actual password
points was larger than a fixed threshold of 50 pixels (Figure 3).
We selected this threshold for easier comparison of our results
with an earlier study on the security of cued-recall graphical
passwords using saliency masks [10].
The downside of this approach is that, in a real-world system,
the success of a login attempt, and in turn password memorabil-
ity, directly depends on the specific value of this threshold: If
the threshold is too small, users won’t be able to login success-
fully anymore; if it is too large, login success would increase
but security would decrease considerably as well given that
any reasonably close password point would be accepted by the
authentication system. We therefore also evaluated memorabil-
ity directly on the Euclidean distances calculated between all
















Figure 5: Number of failed login attempts for PINs and graphical pass-
word with / without saliency mask over all four sessions (four weeks),
averaged over all participants. Error bars indicate the standard error.
four selected and actual password points. This approach does
not depend on any specific threshold and allows us to decouple
password memorability from potential security issues caused
by a “wrong” threshold.
RESULTS
69 participants (14 female, 55 male) aged between 20 and
48 years (M = 25.3, SD = 5.1) registered for the main study
and completed the validation session. Overall, 42 participants
dropped out over the course of the following four weeks. In the
end, 26 participants (six female, 20 male) aged between 21 and
48 years (M = 26.0, SD = 5.9) completed all login sessions
until after the fourth week. Table 1 provides an overview of
all results discussed in the following sections.
Overall Password Memorability
First, we evaluated overall password memorability for the three
types of passwords considered in this work: 4-digit PIN, graph-
ical password with saliency mask, and graphical password
without saliency mask. We analyzed the percentages of suc-
cessful login attempts (Figure 4) and the number of failed login
attempts (Figure 5) for all four sessions (validation and week
1, 2, 4) and across all 26 participants. The analysis showed that
participants could remember all their passwords best in the
validation session (M = 0.27, SE = 0.106). While the average
number of failed login attempts across all password types in-
creased considerably after one week (M = 1.62, SE = 0.27),
it decreased again after two (M = 1.19, SE = 0.27), indicat-
ing a learning effect, and remained stable after four weeks
(M = 1.19, SE = 0.27). We tested whether the type of pass-
word had any effect on memorability using a one-way repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA showed
no statistically significant difference between the three types
of passwords, F(2,50) = 0.756, p = .475. Mauchly’s test of
sphericity could not show a statistically significant differences
for the variances, χ2(2) = 1.586, p = .452. The effect size
was very small, η2 = .029.
To analyse password memorability in more detail, we followed
the multi-store memory model by Atkinson and Shiffrin [4].
According to their model, short-term memory lasts for approxi-
mately 15 to 30 seconds, while long-term memory provides the
lasting retention of information and lasts from several minutes
to a lifetime. Our participants performed the initial password
Baseline Saliency mask Image complexity
Overall F(2,50) = 0.756 N/A N/A
Long-term F(2,50) = 0.123 F(1,25) = 1.995 N/A
Short-term F(2,66) = 29.132* t(68) =−2.160* t(22) = 1.719, t(21) =−1.356, t(23) = 1.169
Table 1: Overview of the main study results. Statistically significant results are marked with a *. Note that the measure for the baseline tests is the
number of failed login attempts, whereas for analyzing saliency masks and image complexity the new measure based on Euclidean distance between
password points was used.






















Figure 6: Euclidean distances between the selected and actual password
points for graphical passwords with and without saliency mask over all
four sessions (four weeks), averaged over all participants. Error bars
indicate the standard error.
validation about 30 seconds after receiving their passwords.
Thus, in the following analysis, we distinguish between short-
term password memorability, which only includes the initial
validation session, as well as long-term memorability, which
includes all remaining sessions after one, two, and four weeks.
Long-term Memorability
To analyze long-term password memorability for the different
types of passwords we again performed a one-way repeated
measures ANOVA on the number of failed login attempts of all
26 participants after one, two, and four weeks (Table 2). The
analysis did not show any statistically significant difference in
memorability between password types, F(2,50) = 0.123, p =
.885. Mauchly’s test of sphericity could not show a statistically
significant difference, χ2(2)= 1.492, p= .474. The effect size
was small, η2 = .005.
Impact of Saliency Masks on Graphical Passwords
Furthermore, we investigated the impact of saliency masks on
memorability of graphical passwords by using the distance
measure described before. As this measure is not meaning-
ful for analyzing PINs, we excluded PINs from this analysis.
We first calculated the average Euclidean distance between
all selected and actual password points for each participant
(see Figure 6). We then performed a one-way repeated mea-
sures ANOVA on the mean distances for each graphical pass-
word type across all participants. Despite the average distance
between selected and actual password point being smaller
for passwords defined on images without saliency mask, the
ANOVA could not show any statistically significant differ-
ence, F(1,25) = 1.995, p = .170. The effect size was small,
η2 = .074.
























Figure 7: Euclidean distances between the selected and actual password
points for graphical passwords defined on images with low, medium, and
high complexity over all four sessions (four weeks), averaged over all
participants. Error bars indicate the mean, whiskers the standard error.
Impact of Image Complexity on Memorability
Finally, we analyzed the impact of image complexity on
the memorability of graphical passwords with and without
saliency mask. We compared the mean distances between the
actual and the selected password points for the three image
complexities (low, medium, and high complexity). The mean
distances for the three complexities were different (Figure 7).
Interestingly, more complex images led to smaller distances
between selected and actual password points in the long-term.
We explain this by complex images providing more opportuni-
ties to select memorable password points not masked out.
Given that images were randomly assigned to participants
during registration, we had no influence on how often each
image combination was used. Due to the high drop-out rate,
we did not conduct further statistical tests.
Short-term Memorability
To analyze short-term password memorability for different
password types we again used a one-way repeated measures
ANOVA. The ANOVA was performed on the number of failed
login attempts of all 69 participants who completed the val-
idation session. The mean number of failed login attempts
across all participants was MPIN = 0.073 (SD = 0.356) for the
PIN, MGP = 0.3188 (SD = 0.757) for the graphical password
without saliency mask, and MGPs = 0.5507 (SD = 1.007) for
the graphical password with saliency mask. Because Levene’s
test indicated no homogeneity of variances, F(2,66) = 29.132,
we performed a Games-Howell’s post-hoc test to analyze the
differences between the types of passwords in pairwise com-
parisons. The test showed a statistically significant difference
between both graphical passwords and the PIN, p < .05.
GP without Saliency Mask GP with Saliency Mask PIN
Week 1 M = 1.462, SD = 1.392 M = 2.000, SD = 1.265 M = 1.577, SD = 1.447
Week 2 M = 1.077, SD = 1.354 M = 1.154, SD = 1.405 M = 1.308, SD = 1.490
Week 4 M = 1.269, SD = 1.430 M = 1.115, SD = 1.366 M = 1.077, SD = 1.383
Table 2: Means and standard deviations of the number of failed login attempts for different password types after first, second, and fourth week of study.
Impact of Saliency Mask on Memorability
Similar to the long-term analysis, we investigated the impact of
saliency masks on short-term memorability of graphical pass-
words using the distance measure described before. We first
compared the Euclidean distances between the selected and ac-
tual password points. For graphical passwords without saliency
mask the mean distance was 33.16 px (SD = 55.94 px) while
for graphical passwords with saliency mask it was 57.04 px
(SD = 85.45 px). We then performed a paired t test, which
showed a statistically significant effect of saliency masks on
password memorability, t(68) =−2.160, p < .05. The effect
size was small, r = .03. This result suggests that passwords
defined on an image without salience mask are easier to re-
member in the short-term.
Impact of Image Complexity on Memorability
We finally analyzed the impact of complexity on the short-
term memorability of graphical passwords with and without
saliency mask. We compared mean distances between the
actual and selected password points for the three image com-
plexities (low, medium, and high complexity). The mean dis-
tances were Mhigh = 45.01 (SE = 10.93), Mmedium = 45.24 px
(SE = 9.72 px), and Mlow = 44.74 px (SE = 11.28 px). Be-
cause we only compared image complexity for the two graph-
ical passwords, we performed a series of paired t tests with
Bonferroni correction of the significance level to correct the
p-value to p = (0.05/3 = .016). The results could not reveal
statistically significant difference in password memorability
between image complexities: low vs. medium: t(22) = 1.719,
p = .100; low vs. high: t(21) = −1.356, p = .189; medium
vs. high: t(23) = 1.169, p = .254.
Questionnaire
From the questionnaires completed by 24 participants after the
fourth week, we received valuable feedback on the perceived
difficulty of remembering their own graphical passwords (see
Figure 8) as well as on the image complexities. To analyse the
perceived difficulty, we performed a Wilcoxon signed ranks
test but did not find any statistically significant difference
between graphical passwords with saliency mask (MdnGPs =
2.5) and graphical password without saliency mask (MdnGP =
3), T= 98, p> .05, r =−.005. To analyze the perceived image
complexity we used a Friedman analysis of variance by ranks
on participant responses for the three complexities.
We also asked for the context in which participants had con-
ducted the study. This included the location or situation in
which they entered the passwords, any memory aids used, or
whether any elements in the images helped them to memorize
the passwords. For the memory aids, we explicitly told partici-
pants that their answer would not influence their chances in the





























Figure 8: Distribution of responses to question “How difficult was it to
remember your graphical passwords?”.
We found that 17 out of 24 participants performed the study
at home, four did so at work, and three in varying locations
(for example, at home, at work, or while commuting). 15 par-
ticipants reported of not having used any memory aids. Two
participants wrote down the passwords, while seven partici-
pants used other types of memory aids or mnemonics.
Participants in the second pre-study reported of having used
different strategies for defining passwords, such as selecting
password points that form a square, for example around an ob-
ject or an animal’s eye, or connecting structures of a building
(see Figure 9). This was exploited by some participants in the
main study for memorizing these passwords. Some tried to cre-
ate stories or rhymes around the password points, memorized
the arrangement of the single password points with regard to
each other, or tried to fit them into geometrical shapes (“For
the dog, the password was in a clockwise square shape around
the eye.”, P4). Image elements that the participant felt attached
to also seemed to be useful as memory aids for some (for
example, “I once had a dog – I could instantly remember
the password.”, P17). Finally, some participants reported that
the symmetric alignment of password points made it easier to
remember the complete password.
Similarly, participants in the main study reported of having
used different strategies to memorize PINs. Some created
equations from the digits (for example, the first digit is the
sum of the last two), associated the PIN with important dates
(“The last two digits were my birthday in reverse order.”,
P38), created sequences of ascending or descending digits,
memorized the arrangement of the digits on a keypad, or fitted
the digits into a rhythm (“eight–one–forty–four”, P4).
Figure 9: Example strategies to select and memorize graphical passwords: clockwise square shape around objects (in this case the dog’s eye) (a), straight
line (in this case the four rooftop corners of a building) (b), and prominent points (c).
DISCUSSION
For passwords defined on images with saliency masks we
found that at the end of our study, users on average selected
points about 30 px further away from the actual password point,
compared to passwords defined on images without saliency
masks. This suggests a tradeoff between security and usability
which needs to be taken into account by designers of authenti-
cation schemes based on graphical passwords. Interestingly,
this distance constantly became smaller during our study, sug-
gesting that there is indeed a learning effect which may lead
to that ultimately password points are remembered more accu-
rately. This needs to be investigated in future work.
Another interesting observation was that images with a higher
complexity seem to be able and deal with the aforementioned
challenge. It is striking from Figure 7 that for images with high
complexity, the distance between selected and actual password
point was quite small in week four. We assume the reason
for this to be that, apart from the learning effect, complex
images provide more opportunities to select memorable pass-
word points. This suggests that images of high complexity
might be a better choice for authentication schemes based on
graphical passwords. Note, however, that the impact of image
complexity on security is still to be determined in future work.
Furthermore, we qualitatively assessed heat maps created from
passwords which participants of the main study rated to be
easy and difficult to remember. Heat maps visually encode
image areas in which password points were selected by several
participants; the more password points fall in a specific box
(edge length 50×50 px) of a regular grid overlaid onto the
image, the darker the color. This provided some interesting
insights. Saliency masks seem to be effective in masking out
many of the preferred password points. At the same time,
participants found a number of workarounds. For example,
some users defined passwords in a square shape surrounding
a masked out object, which aided memorability. Also, users
still defined passwords close to prominent points that were,
however, masked out. This seemed to make it much more
difficult for users to remember these passwords, probably
also due to the fact that the saliency mask was missing as a
reference in the authentication interface. From this we learn
that ways need to be investigated how users can be kept from
defining password points that consider the saliency mask as
a reference point. An immediate validation upon registration
may make this challenge apparent to users.
Finally, users seemed to better memorize passwords defined on
images depicting an object users had some kind of connection
to, for example, a pet a user owns or once owned. This is
similar to a PIN representing the date of a user’s birthday or
wedding day. Interestingly though, while the latter case might
compromise safety (for example, if the attacker knows the
user very well), this would not be the case for the graphical
passwords, since the image would not support the attacker in
guessing the password points. Note, however, that there could
be cases where an image could reveal hints to an attacker, for
example, if the image showed a number of people, some of
which are close friends of the user. As a result, an attacker
might guess that password points were defined on the faces of
these persons. To exploit the aforementioned phenomenon to
increase memorability while not hinting at password points,
users could be asked a number of questions upon registration
to a graphical password system, for example, about pets they
own(ed), cities they live(d) in, or cars they once drove. The
system could then suggest a respective image to define the
password on (or even with a pre-defined password).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
There are several limitations to our study. First, the size of
the tested image set was limited. We cannot exclude further
image properties to have any influence on memorability, par-
ticularly in cases where users are allowed to select their own
images. Second, the size and background of our sample was
limited. Hence, we cannot claim that results are generaliz-
able to user groups other than those that participated in the
study (for example, children, elderly people, or other cultures).
Third, the duration of our study was limited to four weeks. In
future work we plan to investigate the impact of specific im-
age properties on password memorability and cases in which
users have to remember their passwords for several months.
Fourth, we presented pre-defined passwords to the participants.
While authentication systems such as ATMs use pre-defined
passwords as an additional security enhancing property, many
current systems use user-defined passwords. The presented
results need to be re-validated with user-defined passwords.
We focused on the mouse as the only input modality. It is im-
portant to note that graphical passwords with saliency masks
can also be used with other modalities, including but not lim-
ited to touch and gaze – or even a combination [21]. This
makes the approach potentially useful for any application do-
main that requires user authentication, from simple online
forms, over high-security devices (ATMs), to portable devices
(smartphones, laptops). It is an open question how graphical
passwords schemes can be implemented on these platforms.
For example, it is not clear whether users should be allowed to
choose images and/or passwords themselves or whether cer-
tain password patterns or shapes should be enforced or maybe
even prohibited to increase security and memorability.
This leads to another potential direction for future research.
In contrast to random PIN generators, no established method
exists to create secure and memorable graphical passwords.
Password points could be randomly distributed over the image
but this ignores the potential of constructing password aids
based on the selected points, for example, as seen in this
work a story that participants make up around these points. It
is interesting to think of how a random graphical password
generator would look like and how it could consider such aids
to make the generated passwords more memorable.
CONCLUSION
In this work we conducted an analysis of the impact of saliency
masks on the short and long-term memorability of cued-recall
graphical passwords. Results of a user study with 26 partici-
pants over four weeks suggest that users remember password
points defined on images with saliency masks less accurately.
At the same time, images of high complexity seem to be able
to address this challenge.
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